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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to determine the extent to which it is possible to establish a
‘base’ and ‘surge’ strategy for logistics provision with a particular emphasis on minimising
environmental and economic costs. Our method is the combination of empirical research
outputs on the impact of uncertainty on economic and environmental costs, and a
synthesis of the literature on resilience and the role of flexibility therein. We find that
logistics planners either build contingents into their schedules (a priori) or they respond
with contingencies (a posteriori). The former is associated with a ‘base‘ approach; an
example of which may be the incorporation of ‘slack time‘ into a schedule to
accommodate expected delays due to road congestion. The latter is equivalent to a
‘surge‘ approach where as an example the logistics provider may have capacity flexibility,
in the form of acquiring additional vehicles, to accommodate post-plan changes in
shipper volume requirements. This paper explicitly rationalises the links between
uncertainty, ‘base’ and ‘surge’ supply chain strategies, and the strategic use of logistics
flexibility, in minimising environmental and economic costs in a logistics triad. The output
is in the form of a conceptual managerial feedback control system.
Introduction:
The challenges facing supply chain managers due to uncertainty are well documented
(Davis, 1993, Mason-Jones and Towill, 1998, Peck et al, 2003, Van der Vorst and
Beulens, 2002). Only recently has the concept been extended to focus specifically on the
impact of uncertainty on logistics operations (Sanchez Rodrigues et al, 2008).
In meeting the challenges afforded by uncertainty, strategies adopted may potentially
lead to increased costs in the supply chain. More specifically ‘base’ (lean) and ‘surge’
(agile) manufacturing strategies have been advocated as ways to cope with demand
uncertainty (Christopher and Towill, 2001, Christopher and Towill, 2002). Hence,
manufacturing companies in the supply network will typically either aim to track the
variations by creating a ‘surge’ in capacity, hence leading to increased production on-
costs, or else buffer themselves against such variations through inventory which,
although ensuring a level or ‘base’ capacity requirement, increases the risk of stock
holding and obsolescence costs. More recently, empirical research on logistics operations
has shown that uncertainty leads to increases in both economic and environmental costs
(Sanchez Rodrigues et al, 2010c).
The aim of this paper is to develop a model that incorporates ‘base’ and ‘surge’ strategies
to accommodate the particular characteristics of uncertainty associated with logistics
provision. More specifically, the model is to be in the form of a management feedback
system that focuses on minimising environmental and economic costs.
Logistics uncertainty:
Sanchez Rodrigues et al (2008) have undertaken a synthesis of the literature on supply
chain uncertainty from which they have developed an uncertainty model focussing
specifically on freight transport operations. The model may be conceptualised as in Figure
1 which highlights the areas where uncertainty may occur; anywhere in the logistics triad
(customer, supplier or carrier) control systems and the external environment. The model
of Figure 1 has subsequently been tested via focus groups and a survey with participation
from practitioners and policy makers (Sanchez
Rodrigues et al, 2010b).
The uncertainty model of Figure 1 focuses on the logistics triad, arguably the minimum
unit of analysis for any supply chain study (Beier, 1989, Naim et al, 2006). Pe
the logistics triad is the concept that the carrier is an integral member of the supply
chain (Stank and Goldsby, 2000). By considering the logistics triad it is then possible to
consider the value adding nature of freight transport that contrib
performance of the supply chain and in delivering customer value (Mason and Lalwani,
2006).
It is often seen that freight transport operations have to be flexible in responding to
uncertainties so as to ensure effectively delivery of g
Boughton, 2003) while at the same time minimising the impact of transport on economic
and environmental costs (Duclos et al., 2003). The offering of flexibility has often been
as a result of the commoditisation of freight tr
“one size fits all” strategy to logistic provision (Bask, 2001,). The result is a potential
dichotomy in attempting to achieve flexibility and cost reduction.
Figure 1: The logistics triad uncertainty model (S
Naim et al (2006) suggest that a proactive strategy, where different flexibility types are
considered, is a more effective way for carriers to deliver value in the supply chain.
Based on a synthesis of the existing literature
flexibility capabilities that carriers should consider when offering their services;
Rodrigues et al, 2010a, Sanchez
utes to the overall
oods (Narus and Anderson, 1996,
ansport with carriers adopting a reactive
anchez Rodrigues et al, 2008)
they highlight a number of generic
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x Mode flexibility Ability to provide different modes of transport
x Fleet flexibility Ability to provide different vehicle types to carry different
goods
x Vehicle flexibility Ability to configure vehicles to carry products of different
types or to cater for different loading facilities
x Node flexibility Ability to plan, approve and implement new nodes in the
network
x Link flexibility Ability to establish new links between nodes
x Temporal flexibility Ability to sequence infrastructure investment and the
degree to which the use of such infrastructure requires
coordination between users
x Capacity flexibility Ability of a transport system to accommodate variations
or changes in traffic demand
x Routing flexibility Ability to accommodate different routes
x Communication
flexibility
Ability to manage a range of different information types
Method:
The research underpinning this paper follows the overall process as given in Figure 2.
The conceptual model is as given in Figure 1 (Sanchez Rodrigues et al, 2008) which has
been tested through opinion based methods such as focus groups and surveys (Sanchez
Rodrigues et al, 2010a, Sanchez Rodrigues et al, 2010b). A number of empirical case
studies have been undertaken which have been analysed in terms of the impact of
uncertainty on freight transport costs and CO2 equivalent emissions (e.g. Sanchez
Rodrigues et al, 2010c).
Figure 2: Development of the logistics triad uncertainty model
This paper focuses on the last stage of the research process wherein we take the results
of the preceding stages and close the loop back to the body of literature in order to
extend the logistics triad uncertainty model. In particular we interrogate the freight
transport flexibility types developed by Naim et al (2006) to show which are most
relevant to a ‘surge’ and ‘base’ response to uncertainty. We also explore the literature on
supply chain resilience with the view to the establishment of a final refined model in the
form of a management feedback system.
Analysis and Findings:
Opinion based research (Sanchez Rodrigues et al, 2010a, Sanchez Rodrigues et al,
2010b) identifies the expectations of stakeholders to the likely causes of uncertainty in
the logistics triad. The biggest expected uncertainly is a delay with the most dominant
being due to road congestion. Road congestion is an external uncertainty source that in
the main is mostly predictable based on the time of day that road journeys are
undertaken. With routeing algorithms, carriers can accommodate the expected delays
into their planned schedules. When unexpected events, such as road traffic accidents, do
occur their occurrence can be mitigated by the application of satellite navigation systems
that enable alternative routes to be sought.
Conceptual Opinionbased Empirical Analytical
Refined
model
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The second biggest issue emerging from the opinion based research was the uncertainty
due to changing demand from customers. Demand tends to be highly volatile with
unexpected short-notice additional transport requirements or cancellations of previously
agreed loads. This volume volatility can be exacerbated by poor information visibility can
which reduces demand accuracy, increases safety stock levels at the shipper and
increases the number of unnecessary transport movements. The lack of demand
accuracy can have a knock-on effect on the volatility of transport volume requirements.
In empirical case based research Sanchez Rodriguez et al (2010c) evaluate the impact of
uncertainty in the logistics triad on economic and environmental costs. They found that
uncertainty led to two phenomena, which they term as ‘extra distance’ and ‘extra time’.
‘Extra distance / extra time’ may be defined as any non value-added or unnecessary
distance / time within a distribution network due to supply chain uncertainty, and defined
as the difference between the distance/time vehicles actually ran, and the distance/time
they would have needed to have run if:
x the transport operation had received accurate and timely information on the
volumes to be moved, and/or
x there had been no unexpected delays at loading or unloading points and/or
x there had been no operational failures within the distribution network and/or
x there had been no congestion on the journey that could not have been foreseen
‘Extra distance’ has the potential to increase fuel usage leading to increased costs and
engine emissions while ‘extra time’ leads to unnecessary additional slack time built in the
schedules hence not fully utilising the vehicle resources available.
Observations were undertaken of a FMCG secondary distribution operation based in the
UK (Sanchez Rodrigues et al, 2010c). Observations included interrogating the vehicle
routing and scheduling (VRS) system used to optimise, track and trace, and re-optimise
transport movements. In addition, discussions with planners and managers were
undertaken to corroborate and elaborate on the interpretation of data from the VRS
system. The data of interest for our paper is shown in the first two columns of Table 1;
the ‘extra distance / time’ types and the causes of uncertainty. In the other columns we
include some description of each ‘extra distance / time’ type as well as the mitigations
approaches used by the planners.
The mitigation approaches we have classified as ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’, and we have
related them to ‘base’ and ‘surge’ strategies respectively. In the ‘a priori’ category, there
is potentially sufficient information available before the event that causes the
uncertainty. We note what was actually done (for the case of route diversion) and, in
italics, what the planners believed could be done if the information was made available,
enabled via communication flexibility (for the cases of load more than advised and
products not loaded). In the ‘a posteriori’ case action can only be taken after the event
and we note in Table 1 what was actually actioned by the planners and relate such
actions to capacity, communication, fleet and routing flexibilities.
The observations of Table 1 are synonymous the training guidelines developed for the
United States of America military logisticians (Brecke and Garcia, 1995, 1998). Logistics
decision making, as that undertaken by logistics planners, is a temporal activity and is
dependent on a critical path timeline. We redraw their generic timeline as Figure 3 which
is modified to encapsulate the type of uncertainties and mitigations we have defined in
Table 1.
The Start Point, SP, equates to any event, or uncertainty cause, that disrupts the
logistics operation. The Recognition Phase is that time during which the planner is aware
of the event occurring. The planner can be said to have ‘sensed’ the occurrence of the
event by the Recognition Point, RP. The planner then has a Decision Window, DW, by
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which to seek alternative courses of action during the Uncertainty Reduction Phase
before he makes a decision at the Decision Point, DECP and starts the Implementation
Phase at the Default Point, DEFP.
Extra distance/time
types
Uncertainty causes Description A posteriori ‘surge’
mitigation
A priori ‘base’
mitigation
Extra distance/time
due to route diversion
Road restrictions Extra distance needs
to be run in an
attempt to minimise
the delay to the trip.
But this may not
always be possible
and hence extra time
generated.
Routing flexibility to
accommodate re-
routeing.
Communication
flexibility to utilise
GPS and re-routing
software.
‘Extra time’ built into
the plan when it is
known that at certain
times of the day there
is likely to be delays
e.g. rush hour or
evening curfews
Unplanned Road
Congestion
Extra distance/time
due to delays
Store Delays may occur,
e.g. due to slow
(un)loading at stores/
suppliers. This could
incur an additional
vehicle due to the
vehicle originally
assigned to the trip
may not arrive at
destination on time.
Capacity flexibility to
accommodate
variations or changes
in traffic demand.
Routing flexibility to
get around delays.
Suppliers
Unplanned stops
Unplanned Road
Congestion
Extra distance/time
due to load more than
advised
Late notification of
extra volume from
stores
The originally planned
vehicle size is not
appropriate and
hence additional
vehicle are need to
accommodate a
higher volume.
Capacity flexibility to
accommodate
variations or changes
in traffic demand. Link
flexibility to allow
vehicles to be
sourced from other
flows.
Advanced notice of
changes in planned
volume.
Communication
flexibility required to
accommodate new
sources of
information.
Late notification of
extra volume from
suppliers
Extra distance/time
due to inappropriate
vehicle size
Technical vehicle
failure
Original vehicle not
available for
departure and may be
substituted by a
number of smaller
sized vehicles.
Capacity flexibility and
Fleet flexibility to
provide different
vehicle types.
Other Product not loaded at
distribution centres
Volume accumulates
for the next day and
this product ultimately
needs to be moved
which may lead to late
notification of extra
volume.
Capacity flexibility to
accommodate
variations or changes
in traffic demand.
Routing flexibility to
ensure full vehicle
loads.
Advanced notice of
missed additional
products.
Communication
flexibility required to
accommodate new
sources of
information.
Product not loaded at
suppliers
Table 1: Empirical data analysis
It may be concluded that DW defines the time which it takes for the logistics operation
respond to the Event and by DEFP the logistics operations have recovered. We may
postulate that how well and quickly that recovery is achieved is dependent on the
inherent flexibilities of the logistics triad, or how ready is the logistics triad in responding
to uncertainty. There is also a feedback phase where the lessons learnt from the actions
undertaken are utilised by planners in preparing for the next possible event.
Approaches that detect and manage, or sense and respond, to unplanned or abnormal
occurrences is well known in the literature (Haeckel and Nolan, 1993) with examples of
its implementation again coming from military logistics (Tripp et al., 2006).
In addition, we find analogue between our research findings and supply chain resilience
(for example, Christopher and Peck, 2004, Sheffi and Rice Jr, 2005). Ponomarov and
Holcomb (2009) define supply chain resilience as “the adaptive capability of the supply
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chain to prepare for unexpected events, respond to disruptions, and recover from them
by maintaining continuity of operations”.
Figure 3: The logistics planner’s decision timeline
The supply chain resilience literature encapsulates the concepts of readiness, response,
and recovery. With consideration of Figure 3 and with the inclusion of the concept of
sensing we may define logistics resilience as;
a) Readiness: before SP, the logistics triad is prepared for uncertainty or a disruptive
event through the development of freight transport flexibility capabilities at a
reasonable cost.
b) Sensing: minimising the lag between the event occurring and the logistics triad’s
recognition of the event, RP, ensures the number of options available to planners
is maximised.
c) Response: reaction to a specific event is given by DW. A quick and flexible
response implies minimising the time to react to the disruptions and begin the
recovery phase.
d) Recovery: a return to normal stable or steady state conditions, by the
implementation point, IP
The implications of developing adequate flexibility types on resilience are as given in
Figure 4, which is a development of Bodendorf and Zimmerman (2005) who used similar
curves to highlight the benefits of an electronic disturbance detection system. Hence, the
sooner an event occurs, the more options that are available to a planner for corrective
action, and hence the possibility of finding a better course of action in the time available
increases. Thus costs may be minimised.
(a) ------------------------------------------(b)
Figure 4: The benefits of resilience – (a) without resilience, (b) with resilience
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Much of the above discussion concerns the ‘a posteriori’ actions after an event has
occurred. But as we noted in Table 1, with the two cases where ‘a posteriori’ actions are
the norm, facilitating communication flexibility would enable ‘a priori’ actions to be taken.
In such a situation we would then find that the cost curves shown in Figure 4 will become
as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Benefits of enhanced communication flexibility leading to ‘a priori’ knowledge
Achieving the cost curve in Figure 5 will require information visibility in the logistics triad.
Empirical observations have noted that while additional loads, and in many cases volume
changes, are known well in advance by suppliers, stores or distribution centres, these are
often not communicated in time for the logistics planner’s ‘a priori’ schedule. Hence, a
simple action, observed in another case (Naim et al, 2009) would be to ensure that such
information is transferred immediately and directly to the logistics planner, thereby
increasing communication flexibility.
Bringing all the elements of the findings together, we may then develop a management
feedback control system as shown in Figure 6. Sensing events, through real-time data
collection, is a critical element of the system, whether it be for ‘a priori’ or ‘a posteriori’
decision making.
Figure 6: Management feedback control system to minimise extra distance / time
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Notable in the case research (Sanchez Rodrigues et al, 2010c) is the lack of appreciation
of the impact of extra distance / time which may yield increased additional economic and
environmental costs. Over a year, in a large logistics network, that may equate to £1
million and 500 tonnes of CO2.
Conclusion:
We find that logistics planners either build contingents into their schedules (a priori) or
they respond with contingencies (a posteriori). The former is associated with a ‘base’
approach while the latter is equivalent to a ‘surge‘ approach. The logistics triad may
achieve enhanced resilience through the development of freight transport flexibilities. In
particular, within the context of a management feedback control system, communication
flexibility will enhance the ability to sense and respond ‘a priori’ to an event.
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